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INVESTMENT TREATIES, OFFSHORE 
FINANCE, AND THE RESOURCE CURSE 
KARL M.F. LOCKHART* 
Abstract: Questions of how best to understand offshore financial centers 
(“OFCs”)—countries that have low or zero tax rates, strong banking secrecy reg-
ulation, and easy-to-form legal entities—and what, if anything, the international 
community should do about them remain fixed on the agenda of national and in-
ternational discourse. This Essay seeks to provide a new theoretical perspective 
on tax havens and applies this perspective to the cross-border legal regimes that 
govern international investment. This new analytical framework sees offshore fi-
nancial centers as countries that are victims of the “resource curse,” as that term 
is described in economic development literature. Often physically small, isolated 
islands with scant natural resources, OFCs lack any true commodity to exchange 
in the global marketplace. As a result, OFCs have transformed their legal systems 
into a resource, “selling” their favorable laws to businesses and individuals in ex-
change for corporate registration costs and money management fees as a means 
of gaining revenue for the state and its inhabitants. Applying this framework to 
international investment law yields new insights into why countries enter into bi-
lateral investment treaties and how the true social costs of international invest-
ment should be understood. 
INTRODUCTION 
Offshore financial centers,1 despite their moniker of “secrecy jurisdic-
tions,”2 cannot seem to stay out of the news. In 2016, an anonymous figure 
leaked more than 11.5 million documents from a Panamanian law firm named 
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 1 Offshore financial centers (“OFCs”) are also called “tax havens” and “secrecy jurisdictions.” 
This Essay will use these terms interchangeably. 
 2 See, e.g., Sarah Bracking, Secrecy Jurisdictions and Economic Development in Africa: The Role 
of Sovereign Spaces of Exception in Producing Private Wealth and Public Poverty, 41 ECON. & 
SOC’Y 615, 617 (2012); Nick Gregory, Note, Lax Tax: The Threat of Secrecy Jurisdictions and What 
the International Community Should Do About It, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 859, 861 
(2012). 
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Mossack Fonseca. These documents—which became known as the “Panama 
Papers”—unveiled tax evasion and avoidance committed by over 140 politi-
cians, celebrities, and other individuals at the highest levels of society in coun-
tries worldwide.3 The repercussions of the leak shook global power structures, 
leading to the resignation of Iceland’s prime minister,4 historic Supreme Court 
cases in Pakistan banning a prominent politician for life,5 and the sentencing of 
Argentinian soccer superstar Lionel Messi to twenty-one months in jail for tax 
fraud.6 Sadly, it also led to the death of a journalist in Malta, who was killed by 
a car bomb after investigating corruption based on documents from the leak.7 
One year after the Panama Papers, another leak of over 13.4 million records 
known as the “Paradise Papers” further implicated elites around the world,8 
                                                                                                                           
 3 INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, Panama Papers: Explore the Panama 
Papers Key Figures, ICIJ, https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/explore-panama-papers-
key-figures/ [https://perma.cc/8ETD-X8R6]. Mossack Fonseca later closed as a result of the scandal. 
Cat Rutter Pooley & Barney Thompson, Panama Papers Law Firm Mossack Fonseca ‘To Close,’ FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c2501cf4-2824-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 [https://
perma.cc/6AVQ-HNLX]. 
 4 Adam Taylor, Iceland Ousted One Leader Named in the Panama Papers, but Ended Up with 
Another on the List, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world
views/wp/2017/01/11/iceland-ousted-one-leader-named-in-the-panama-papers-but-ended-up-with-
another-on-the-list/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.487334aeacd6 [https://perma.cc/8CCN-N4MU]. The 
next prime minister of Iceland was also implicated by the leaked documents. Id. 
 5 Asad Hashim, Pakistani Court Bans Ex-PM Nawaz Sharif from Parliament for Life, AL 
JAZEERA (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/pakistani-court-bans-pm-nawaz-
sharif-parliament-life-180413072707795.html [https://perma.cc/QU5L-37QZ]. Sharif was later sen-
tenced to ten years in prison. Asad Hashim, Ex-Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif Sentenced to 10 Years 
Over Corruption, AL JAZEERA (July 6, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/pakistan-pm-
nawaz-sharif-sentenced-10-years-corruption-180706113036952.html [https://perma.cc/6ND9-7UXC]. 
 6 Robert W. Wood, FATCA Tax Lessons from Lionel Messi Prison Sentence, FORBES (May 25, 
2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2017/05/25/fatca-tax-lessons-from-lionel-messi-
prison-sentence/#2bd6a0ba2ccc [https://perma.cc/M4HP-5Y99]. A Spanish court later converted 
Messi’s prison sentence into a €252,000 fine as provided under Spanish law. Lionel Messi Tax Fraud 
Prison Sentence Reduced to Fine, BBC NEWS (July 7, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-40534761 [https://perma.cc/B9H4-MECN]. 
 7 Jon Henley, Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Jamie Grierson, Ten Arrested Over Murder of Maltese 
Journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/dec/04/daphne-caruana-galizia-malta-journalist-eight-arrested-murder-inquiry [https://
perma.cc/XRW9-WDQ4]. The victim of the car bomb, Daphne Caruana Galizia, wrote a popular blog 
that criticized high-level political corruption, suspicious business deals, and organized crime in Malta; 
shortly before her death, she investigated and reported on corruption relating to the Panama Papers. Id. 
Maltese and Italian officials believed that organized crime was likely to blame for her murder. Id. 
 8 Cf. James Rothschild, Financier (1883), quoted in Niall Ferguson, The First ‘Eurobonds’: The 
Rothschilds and the Financing of the Holy Alliance, 1818–1822, in THE ORIGINS OF VALUE: THE 
FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL MARKETS 313, 324 (William N. 
Goetzmann & K. Geert Rouwenhorst eds., 2005): 
In the past, [influential people] used to live from the rents of their estates or their offices 
and were therefore never entirely free, but were always chained to a distant landed es-
tate or some local administrative center. But now the system of paper securities frees 
these men to choose whatever place of residence they like; they can live anywhere . . . 
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from the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to Queen Elizabeth.9 Tax havens also 
took center stage in the indictment and prosecution of Paul Manafort. A former 
advisor to President Trump, Manafort has been investigated by U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice special counsel Robert Mueller and faced trials for bank fraud, 
tax fraud, tax evasion, and money laundering in two federal courts.10 In addi-
tion to these leaks and Manafort’s criminal charges, Congress debated offshore 
jurisdictions in relation to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. The new law 
includes a key provision11 which allows multinational companies with cash 
hoards stowed in offshore subsidiaries to repatriate the funds at steeply dis-
counted tax rates.12 
                                                                                                                           
from the interest on their bonds, their portable property, and so they gather together and 
constitute the true power of our capital cities. 
Id. 
 9 Michael Forsythe, Paradise Papers Shine Light on Where the Elite Keep Their Money, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/world/paradise-papers.html [https://
perma.cc/TC52-N3G5]; INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS, Paradise Papers: 
Secrets of the Global Elite, ICIJ (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WGU-Q9JY]. 
 10 Eliza Relman & Grace Panetta, Former Trump Campaign Chairman Paul Manafort Is on Trial 
for Fraud—Here’s What You Need to Know About Him, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2018), https://
www.businessinsider.com/who-is-paul-manafort-and-why-is-he-at-the-center-of-the-trump-russia-
probe-2017-3 [https://perma.cc/FJ8S-DEN2]; Krishnadev Calamur, The Tax Havens at the Heart of 
the Manafort Indictment, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2017/10/manafort-indictment-tax-havens/544394/ [https://perma.cc/TAU9-5VR3]. As of the 
publication of this Essay, Manafort has reached a deal with federal prosecutors. Sharon LaFraniere & 
Kenneth P. Vogel, Paul Manafort Agrees to Cooperate with Special Counsel; Pleads Guilty to Re-
duced Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/us/politics/
manafort-plea-deal.html [https://perma.cc/W9FP-EULY]. 
 11 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 26 U.S.C. § 965 (2017) (“Treatment of deferred foreign 
income upon transition to participation exemption system of taxation.”). 
 12 Jesse Drucker, Companies Warn of Hits from Tax Cuts. Don’t Be Fooled, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/business/corporate-tax-cuts.html [https://perma.cc/
8VCA-WRFU]. To lower taxes using a subsidiary in an offshore financial center, corporations shift 
profits and other taxable events to the subsidiary rather than the onshore parent company. RONEN 
PALAN, RICHARD MURPHY & CHRISTIAN CHAVAGNEUX, TAX HAVENS: HOW GLOBALIZATION RE-
ALLY WORKS 84 (2010). Because it is no longer the onshore company but its offshore subsidiary 
making money, it is taxed by the jurisdiction in which the profit is made at that jurisdiction’s tax 
rate—which for tax havens, is extremely low or zero—rather than at the home country’s tax rate, 
which in the United States is now 21% (formerly 35%). See Chelsey Dulaney, The Tax Overhaul 
Could Boost U.S. Corporate Earnings by 10%, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://blogs.wsj.com/
moneybeat/2018/01/03/the-tax-overhaul-could-boost-u-s-corporate-earnings-by-10/ [https://perma.cc/
M723-A6V8] (discussing the effects of the tax cut on corporate earnings). In the United States, for-
eign profits are not taxed until repatriated (returned to the parent corporation). James R. Hines, Jr. & 
Eric M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business, 109 Q. J. OF ECON. 149, 
154 (1994). Thus, if the company keeps the money offshore and re-invests it in other foreign dealings 
(acquisitions, etc.), it could potentially never pay U.S. tax on those profits, saving the company mil-
lions, if not billions, of dollars—which obviously provides such a company with scant incentive to 
ever repatriate those funds. See GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE 
SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS 106 (Teresa Lavendar Fagan trans. 2015). For example, Apple issued $17 
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With these events in the public eye, the question of what to do about off-
shore financial centers (“OFCs”)13—countries that have low or zero tax rates,14 
strong banking secrecy regulation,15 and easy-to-form legal entities16—is a 
                                                                                                                           
billion in debt in 2013 rather than bringing back some of the $102 billion it had sitting offshore. Wen-
xia Ge, Jeong-Bon Kim, Tiemei Li & Yutao Li, Offshore Operations and Bank Loan Contracting: 
Evidence from Firms That Set Up Subsidiaries in Offshore Financial Centers, 37 J. CORP. FIN. 335, 
336 (2016). 
 13 See generally Ahmed Zoromé, Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an Opera-
tional Definition 26 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/87, 2007) (providing a range of 
definitions of OFCs from a survey of the literature). According to Ahmed Zoromé, offshore jurisdic-
tions display the following factors: “(i) the primary orientation of business toward nonresidents; (ii) 
the favorable regulatory environment (low supervisory requirements and minimal information disclo-
sure) and; (iii) the low- or zero-taxation schemes.” Id. at 4. Zoromé argues convincingly that the ratio 
of net financial services exports to Gross Domestic Product in these countries shows the provision of 
“financial services to non-residents on a scale that is incommensurate with the size and the financing 
of” their own domestic economies. Id. at 7. OFCs hold trillions of dollars in wealth, according to most 
official estimates. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, MONETARY & EXCHANGE AFF. DEP’T, OFFSHORE 
FINANCIAL CENTERS: IMF BACKGROUND PAPER 9 (June 23, 2000), https://www.imf.org/external/
np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm [https://perma.cc/69WW-TML7] [hereinafter IMF BACKGROUND] 
(estimating that “OFC cross-border assets reached a level of US$4.6 trillion at end-June 1999”); U.S. 
SENATE, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFF., PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INVESTIGATIONS, MINORITY & MAJORITY STAFF REP., TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE 
TOOLS, AND SECRECY 1 (Aug. 1, 2006) [hereinafter TAX HAVEN ABUSES REPORT] (citing several 
sources that estimate OFCs as holding between $4.8 trillion and $11.5 trillion); see also Art Durnev, 
TieMei Li & Michel Magnan, Are Offshore Firms Worth More?, 36 J. CORP. FIN. 131, 131–32 (2016) 
(noting that “[b]y 2006, OFC-based institutions managed five to seven trillion U.S. dollars, which is 
five times the amount of two decades ago, representing six to 8% of worldwide wealth under man-
agement”); ZUCMAN, supra note 12, at 3, 35 (estimating the figure at approximately $7.6 trillion, 
accounting for 8% of the global financial wealth of all households). 
 14 See, e.g., DAVID L. MCKEE, DON E. GARNER & YOSRA ABUAMARA MCKEE, OFFSHORE FI-
NANCIAL CENTERS, ACCOUNTING SERVICES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 111, 114, 118–19, 161, 
162 (2000) (noting that Barbados levies taxes on international business companies (“IBCs”) at a rate 
of only between 1–2.5%, and that Bermuda, the Seychelles, and the Cayman Islands do not tax IBC 
profits at all). 
 15 See Anna Manasco Dionne & Jonathan R. Macey, Offshore Finance and Onshore Markets: 
Racing to the Bottom, or Moving toward Efficient?, in OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGU-
LATORY COMPETITION 8, 15 (Andrew P. Morriss ed., 2010) [hereinafter REGULATORY COMPETITION] 
(arguing that “confidentiality is a primary—if not the primary—offshore commodity”). For example, 
the Bahamas prevents disclosure of any confidential bank information to foreign governments unless 
the Supreme Court of the Bahamas approves it. MCKEE ET AL., supra note 14, at 105. Vanuatu has no 
treaties to share tax information with other countries. Id. at 168. Another secrecy innovation is the 
nominee director, who sits on a corporation’s board and whose name is public, but who must vote on 
behalf of the person who hired him or her (often a so-called “beneficial owner” of the company) and 
cannot sell shares of the company without the beneficial owner’s approval. BROOKE HARRINGTON, 
CAPITAL WITHOUT BORDERS: WEALTH MANAGERS AND THE ONE PERCENT 183, 184 (2016) [herein-
after HARRINGTON, CAPITAL]. 
 16 See, e.g., James McConvill, Islands in the Financial Stream: Why Cyprus and the BVI Are Too 
Legit to Quit, 31 J. TAX’N OF INVS. 3, 17 (2014) (providing an example of the ease of raising capital 
and other corporate law applications in the British Virgin Islands). Notable examples include Mauri-
tius (which does not require shareholder or director meetings), the Cayman Islands (which does not 
require companies to release audited financial statements or have any other forms of reporting), and 
the Bahamas (which imposes only minimal recordkeeping requirements and does not require release 
2018] Investment Treaties and the Resource Curse 2667 
constant topic of discussion among reporters, politicians, and academics.17 No-
tions of how best to understand OFCs and what, if anything, the international 
community should do about them remain fixed on the agenda of national and 
international discourse.18 Although tax, corporate, and international criminal 
law are usually the focus of academic research on OFCs,19 these conversations 
have rarely been extended to the field of international investment law. This 
Essay seeks to unite these two strands of discussion by providing a new theo-
retical perspective on tax havens and applying this perspective to the cross-
border legal regimes that govern international investment.20 
This new analytical framework sees OFCs as countries that are victims of 
the “resource curse,” as that term is described in economic development litera-
ture.21 Often physically small, isolated islands with scant natural resources, 
                                                                                                                           
of most reports). MCKEE ET AL., supra note 14, at 107–08, 118–19, 159. Furthermore, company for-
mation may be incredibly fast. For example, the Seychelles International Business Authority is known 
for its efficiency—approving company names in minutes using an automated system and typically 
providing final company approval within two hours of filing articles of association. Id. at 161–62. 
 17 See generally TAX HAVEN ABUSES REPORT, supra note 13 (providing a U.S. Senate Report on 
the abuses allowed by tax havens and the potential national security implications); McConvill, supra 
note 16 (examining the British Virgin Islands as an example of the legitimate tax avoidance system 
that OFCs provide international companies); Brooke Harrington, Inside the Secretive World of Tax-
Avoidance Experts, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2015/10/elite-wealth-management/410842/ [https://perma.cc/RFY3-S4JL] (discussing the difficulty of 
reporting on the disadvantages of tax havens). 
 18 Even the Vatican released a statement that addressed offshore financial centers, suggesting a 
“minimum tax on the transactions accomplished offshore” to address global hunger: 
Today, more than [] half of the commercial world is orchestrated by noteworthy per-
sons that cut down their tax burden by moving the revenues from one site to another ac-
cording to their convenience, transferring the profits into fiscal havens, and the costs in-
to the countries of higher taxation. It appears clear that all these have removed decisive 
resources from the actual economy and contributed to the creation of economic systems 
founded on inequality. Furthermore, it is not possible to ignore the fact that those off-
shore sites, on more occasions, have become usual places of recycling dirty money, 
which is the fruit of illicit income . . . . [I]t was calculated that a minimum tax on the 
transactions accomplished offshore would be sufficient to resolve a large part of the 
problem of hunger in the world: why can’t we undertake courageously the way of a 
similar initiative? 
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH AND THE DICASTERY FOR PROMOTING INTEGRAL 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, “OECONOMICAE ET PECUNIARIAE QUAESTIONES”: CONSIDERATIONS FOR AN 
ETHICAL DISCERNMENT REGARDING SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
12–14 (May 17, 2018). 
 19 See infra notes 30–66 (providing a survey of academic authorities’ analyses of OFCs from 
several different perspectives). 
 20 See infra notes 68–106 and accompanying text. 
 21 See RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RE-
SOURCE CURSE THESIS 1–2 (1993). The counter-intuitive result of “resource curse” thesis is generally 
summarized as follows: 
[A] growing body of evidence suggests that a favourable natural resource endowment 
may be less beneficial to countries at low- to mid-income levels of development than 
2668 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2663 
OFCs lack a true commodity to exchange in the global marketplace. As a re-
sult, OFCs have transformed their legal systems into a resource, “selling” their 
favorable laws to businesses and individuals in exchange for corporate regis-
tration costs and money management fees as a means of gaining revenue for 
the state and its inhabitants.22 Applying this framework to international in-
vestment law yields new insights into why countries enter into bilateral in-
vestment treaties (“BITs”) and how the true social costs of international in-
vestment should be understood. 
This Essay examines some of the arguments in support of and against 
OFCs through the novel lens of the resource curse and suggests possible impli-
cations for international investment law. Part I describes the two main view-
points on OFCs through explaining each approach’s policy rationales and ana-
lytical frameworks.23 Part II lays out a third perspective based on the resource 
curse.24 Part III applies this perspective to international investment law and 
offers several observations based on the new framework.25 This Essay con-
cludes by providing some directions for further research.26 
I. TWO APPROACHES TO OFCS 
This Part discusses the approaches taken by those opposed to and those 
supporting OFCs by examining the policy rationales and analytical frame-
works that they invoke in framing the debate. Section A explains the main pol-
icy rationales given by each side,27 and Section B explains the analytical 
frameworks that academics often use to support these policy rationales.28 
A. Policy Rationales 
On both sides of the debate over OFCs, politicians, journalists, and aca-
demics make outcome-based arguments to support their positions. This Section 
considers some of these policy rationales that opponents and supporters in-
                                                                                                                           
the conventional wisdom might suppose . . . . The new evidence suggests that not only 
may resource-rich countries fail to benefit from a favourable endowment, they may ac-
tually perform worse than less well-endowed countries. 
Id. 
 22 See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 4, 66 (2009) (explaining how 
companies look to incorporate in countries that have laws conducive to their business needs, thus 
creating a “law market” in which countries compete with one another by trying to establish the most 
favorable legal system). 
 23 See infra notes 27–66 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 67–87 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 88–105 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 29–54 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 55–66 and accompanying text. 
2018] Investment Treaties and the Resource Curse 2669 
voke.29 First, opponents criticize OFCs because they facilitate tax evasion for 
the world’s wealthiest individuals.30 This reduces the tax base for onshore 
states,31 which in turn must tax the middle and lower classes more to make up 
for this loss in revenue.32 In addition, criminals often take advantage of the 
secrecy offered in OFCs to launder money from international illegal activi-
ties.33 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See infra notes 30–54 and accompanying text. 
 30 Confidentiality provided by offshore jurisdictions allows those who earn passive income 
abroad not to report it to the tax authorities of their home nations, even though failing to declare all or 
part of one’s income is tax evasion—a criminal penalty in most countries. Craig M. Boise, Regulating 
Tax Competition in Offshore Financial Centers, in REGULATORY COMPETITION, supra note 15, at 50, 
52; PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 83. 
 31 Dionne & Macey, supra note 15, at 11; see STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, U.S. SEN-
ATE, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFF., PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVES-
TIGATIONS, TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (July 17, 2008) (stating that “[e]ach 
year, the U.S. Treasury loses up to $100 billion in tax revenues to offshore tax abuses”); PALAN ET 
AL., supra note 12, at 67 (estimating that the U.S. government alone loses between $10 billion and 
$20 billion in taxes ever year, or potentially even more). 
 32 See Boise, supra note 30, at 59–60; PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 157. Those who move 
their money offshore to evade taxes decrease available funds for schools, highways, and police forces, 
even though they benefit from these public goods. ZUCMAN, supra note 12, at 56–57; Boise, supra 
note 30, at 60 (explaining that the use of tax havens is an example of the freerider problem). But see 
Andrew P. Morriss, The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition, in REGULA-
TORY COMPETITION, supra note 15, at 102, 108–09 [hereinafter Morriss, Role of Offshore Financial 
Centers] (arguing that there is no guarantee that lost tax revenues would be spent on public goods). 
 33 Money laundering is the “process by which the proceeds of a crime are converted into assets 
that appear to have a legitimate origin[].” MARY ALICE YOUNG, BANKING SECRECY AND OFFSHORE 
FINANCIAL CENTERS: MONEY LAUNDERING AND OFFSHORE BANKING 9 (2012); see also Sharon C. 
Cobb, Why Offshore? Exploring the Geographies of Offshore Financial Centers, in WORLDMINDS: 
GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 100 PROBLEMS 237, 240 (Donald G. Janelle, Barney Warf & 
Kathy Hansen eds., 2004) (describing money laundering as the “processing of illegal profits . . . by 
disguising the sources or moving the funds to a place where they are less likely to attract attention”). 
See generally RAYMOND W. BAKER, CAPITALISM’S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND HOW TO 
RENEW THE FREE-MARKET SYSTEM 23–47 (2005) (explaining the three forms of “dirty money”—
criminal, corrupt, and commercial—and providing a “dirty-money user manual” that describes the 
main methods in which such illegal funds are moved across borders); Ping He, A Typological Study on 
Money Laundering, 13 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 15 (2010) (describing various money laun-
dering techniques). The predicate crime—the crime from which the money was obtained—could be 
nearly anything, from selling drugs, to human trafficking, to corruption at a national level; for exam-
ple, dictators like Augosto Pinochet in Chile and Fernando Marcos in the Philippines used offshore 
legal structures to siphon off funds from their respective states. YOUNG, supra, at 11; Gregory, supra 
note 2, at 868; see also BAKER, supra, at 52 (providing estimates of funds that various heads of gov-
ernment allegedly embezzled from their countries). Money laundering usually takes place in three 
stages: first, the proceeds of the crime are immersed (put into the banking system); second, they are 
layered (mixed with funds from legitimate sources); and third, they are integrated (moved throughout 
the financial system). YOUNG, supra, at 10. 
 Because the United States requires declarations when transporting currency in amounts over 
$10,000, the first step in using an offshore financial center to launder money often involves smuggling 
cash from wherever the crime has taken place to the tax haven. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2018); He, supra, at 
16. Once it is there, it can be deposited in corporate bank accounts or trusts, and its owner’s identity is 
hidden from authorities. See Richard K. Gordon, The International Monetary Fund and the Regula-
2670 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2663 
Opponents also protest tax avoidance34 by multinational corporations, 
which often form subsidiaries in OFCs in order to sidestep paying taxes on 
earnings from foreign markets. By keeping cash offshore, companies like Ap-
ple have been able to save billions of dollars on their U.S. tax bills.35 OFCs 
also facilitate transfer pricing, an additional way to reduce taxes36—especially 
for companies with difficult-to-value assets or goods like intellectual proper-
ty.37 Intra-company lending is another means of achieving the same goal.38 
                                                                                                                           
tion of Offshore Centers, in REGULATORY COMPETITION, supra note 15, at 74, 88. Governments, 
though, have become wise to this scheme, and many, like the United States, have instituted “Know 
Your Customer” (“KYC”) requirements—provisions that require banks to gather information on ac-
countholders and report to the proper authority if they believe that the source of funds could be crimi-
nal. He, supra, at 16. Although the extent to which KYC requirements are followed in offshore finan-
cial centers is a matter of debate, criminals who want to take extra precautions when laundering mon-
ey have devised additional tricks, including mixing “dirty money” with legitimate proceeds before 
putting it into the system. Id. at 18. This can be done fairly easily in many offshore financial centers, 
where tourism and other hospitality businesses like hotels and restaurants are prevalent and heavy 
influxes of cash can be explained by fluctuations in a business cycle. Id. at 25. 
 34 Tax avoidance involves either paying less tax due to alternate interpretations of the law, declar-
ing profits in ways or places other than how they were actually earned, or simply deferring tax pay-
ments until a later date. PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 10. 
 35 Jesse Drucker & Simon Bowers, After a Tax Crackdown, Apple Found a New Shelter for Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.
html [https://perma.cc/M4LN-4SH3]; see also Andrea Wong, Americans Are Paying Apple Millions 
to Shelter Overseas Profits, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-
apple-profits/ [https://perma.cc/SCV8-KQMV] (providing an even more infuriating explanation of 
Apple’s tax avoidance). 
 36 Sixty percent of all international trade takes place between different branches of the same com-
pany. PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 18. Because these subsidiaries function as separate companies 
in many ways, they are allowed to conduct business with each other. See id. at 68–69. One subsidiary 
can buy or sell goods to another subsidiary, provide or take on loans from another subsidiary, or even 
license technology or intellectual property rights to another subsidiary. See id. These transactions are 
legal provided that they are done at “arm’s length,” meaning one subsidiary must charge the other “for 
their goods and services at prices equivalent to those that unrelated entities would charge in an open 
market.” Id. Because the companies themselves get to decide what the price would have been in an 
open market transaction, this standard gives companies considerable flexibility and the ability to en-
gage in cost-cutting strategic behavior, especially with regard to company-specific and intangible 
assets. Specific abusive transfer pricing techniques usually include mis-invoicing or misreporting 
transactions between subsidiaries. Id. at 69. 
 37 Firms create a subsidiary in a tax haven and transfer trademarks, copyrights, patents, and other 
forms of intangible property to the new entity; the parent company then licenses the intellectual prop-
erty from the subsidiary, creating profits in the tax haven rather than in the home country. ZUCMAN, 
supra note 12, at 104; Boise, supra note 30, at 53; Morriss, Role of Offshore Financial Centers, supra 
note 32, at 120–21; Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities Are Created by Tax 
Havens?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 661, 667 (2008). Technology companies like Apple, 
Google, and others are strongly enmeshed in the offshore world for this reason. See Daniel Haberly & 
Dariusz Wojcik, Tax Havens and the Production of Offshore FDI: An Empirical Analysis, 15 J. ECON. 
GEOGRAPHY 75, 76 (2015). 
 38 See TAX HAVEN ABUSES REPORT, supra note 13, at 13–14 (describing the system of intra-
company lending to individuals using OFCs); Dharmapala, supra note 37, at 668 (describing intra-
company lending by corporations). 
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Critics also point to studies which show that there may be significant 
agency costs to these complex offshore structures. For example, the secrecy 
offered by OFCs allows corporations to engage in earnings management tech-
niques to hide or smooth over quarters with poor performance.39 This can lead 
to “bad news” building up until a breaking point when the news is released and 
a company’s stock crashes.40 Even worse, it might allow officers of these cor-
porations to engage in illicit self-dealing behavior.41 Research by economists 
indicates that firms with subsidiaries in OFCs are more susceptible to the risk 
of stock price crash.42 They also face higher interest rates,43 more covenants in 
loan agreements,44 and a higher likelihood that creditors will require collat-
eral45 than corporations without OFC subsidiaries. For all these reasons, critics 
of OFCs are generally in favor of the many policies targeted at tax havens. 46 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Luca Errico & Alberto Musalem, Offshore Banking: An Analysis of Micro- and Macro-
Prudential Issues 30, 32, 33, 37 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 99/51999) (providing anal-
ysis of this earnings management technique and its consequences). 
 40 Jeong-Bon Kim, Yinghua Li, & Liandong Zhang, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price 
Crash Risk: Firm-level Analysis, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 639, 642 (2011). 
 41 Ge et al., supra note 12, at 339; Jeong-Bon Kim & TieMei Li, Multinationals’ Offshore Opera-
tions, Tax Avoidance, and Firm-Specific Information Flows: International Evidence, 25 J. INT’L FIN. 
MGMT. & ACCT. 38, 39 (2014). An example of this type of self-dealing occurred in the 2001 Enron 
scandal, which resulted in the American energy company declaring bankruptcy. Kurt Eichenwald & 
Riva D. Atlas, Two Banks Settle Accusations They Aided in Enron Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2003), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/29/business/2-banks-settle-accusations-they-aided-in-enron-
fraud.html [https://perma.cc/UR4E-4N7C] (quoting Robert M. Morgenthau, the Manhattan district 
attorney, “[n]o more phony baloney offshore special purpose vehicles that are not understandable”). 
 42 Kim et al., supra note 40, at 641. But see id. at 659 (stating that the risk is “less pronounced for 
firms with effective external monitoring”). 
 43 Ge et al., supra note 12, at 336, 337. This relationship holds even when controlling for the 
liquidity risk of the parent company. Id. at 352. 
 44 Id. at 352 
 45 Id. 
 46 The three major problems associated with tax havens—money laundering, tax evasion, and tax 
avoidance—have each been dealt with separately by the international community. Money laundering 
has been addressed by at least two international treaties, including the 1988 Vienna Convention and 
the 2000 Palermo Convention, in which signatory countries agreed to cooperate to combat transna-
tional drug trafficking, organized crime, and the illicit proceeds from these activities. See YOUNG, 
supra note 33, at 49–50. In addition, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”)—made up of investi-
gators, prosecutors, and financial supervisors from G7 countries and OECD members—issues anti-
money laundering recommendations that it updates every five years; although FATF recommends that 
all U.N. member states comply with these recommendations, they are not obligatory. Id. at 51, 65; 
Gordon, supra note 33, at 89. 
 Tax evasion has been attacked both at the multilateral and national levels. In 2009, a G-20 summit 
called for the “end of bank secrecy,” proposing another blacklist if countries did not agree to sign twelve 
bilateral treaties with other nations to exchange tax information. ZUCMAN, supra note 12, at 46, 60–61. 
Tax havens therefore often avoided the new blacklist by promising to sign agreements with countries like 
Greenland, which of course has minimal tax information to share. See NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE 
ISLANDS: TAX HAVENS AND THE MEN WHO STOLE THE WORLD 213 (2011). The most recent multilateral 
push against tax evasion came in 2014, when over sixty countries, including tax havens like Bermuda 
and the Cayman Islands, signed an agreement that the OECD coordinated for the automatic exchange of 
2672 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2663 
Conversely, others see OFCs as an overall boon to the global economy. 
These supporters of OFCs point to the ways in which the secrecy and financial 
products OFCs offer can enhance individual freedom. For example, those liv-
ing in developing nations without strong banking systems can often access fi-
nancial services and legal entities provided in tax havens that are not available 
in their home countries.47 By keeping assets offshore, consumers can also pro-
tect themselves from domestic currency fluctuations48 and other risks.49 Pro-
ponents also note that in countries with autocratic governments or rampant 
levels of corruption, OFCs enable individuals to protect their wealth from sei-
zure by dictators or those that would seek to silence political opposition.50 In 
this way, OFCs allow resistance movements to secretly gather support from 
abroad and fund dissenters against oppressive regimes.51 
                                                                                                                           
tax information; however, not all countries have begun to share information yet. See ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV., Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, OECD.ORG, http://www.oecd.
org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/multilateral-competent-authority-agreement.htm [https://perma.
cc/JLH5-YVAF]. At a national level, the United States passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (“FATCA”), which requires all banks to identify which accounts are held by Americans; for those 
foreign banks refusing to comply with such disclosure requirements, all U.S. dividend and interest 
income is subject to a thirty percent withholding tax before it is paid out. ZUCMAN, supra note 12, at 
62–63, 72. The European Union (EU) now has a similar scheme known as the EU Tax Savings Di-
rective. Id. at 69, 71. On this front, efforts may be working, as even countries like the Cayman Islands 
and Switzerland have caved to at least some demands for transparency. See, e.g., Jason C. Sharman, 
Canaries in the Coal Mine: Tax Havens, the Decline of the West and the Rise of the Rest, 17 NEW 
POL. ECON. 493, 500 (2012) (“Every tax haven now exchanges information on criminal offences, 
particularly money laundering and terrorist financing . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 Attempts to counteract corporate tax avoidance have mostly fallen flat. Schemes that offer a one-
time tax break for corporations that repatriate overseas profits—such as the one included in the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, see supra note 12 and accompanying text—have been done before. For 
example, under President George W. Bush, corporations were given a one-year amnesty period to 
repatriate foreign earnings held abroad; instead of having to pay the normal 35% tax to bring funds 
back, corporations were only taxed at 5.25% on those earnings, most of which had previously been 
held by their offshore subsidiaries. PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 55. Although these efforts do yield 
tax revenue, they set poor precedent. In effect, they tell U.S. companies with cash overseas that they 
should simply wait until the next “one-time” tax break to repatriate the funds, rather than ever pay the 
full corporate tax on their overseas profits. See id. 
 47 ZUCMAN, supra note 12, at 52; IMF BACKGROUND, supra note 13, at 8. 
 48 IMF BACKGROUND, supra note 13, at 1–2. 
 49 See, e.g., HARRINGTON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 147 (describing how in some countries, 
like Brazil and Mexico, it is possible to go to a bank and bribe the teller to turn over a list of those 
who own the largest accounts so that criminals can target those individuals for kidnapping, robbery, or 
extortion). 
 50 PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 23. 
 51 See YOUNG, supra note 33, at 135; Andrew P. Morriss, Changing the Rules of the Game: Off-
shore Financial Centers, Regulatory Competition & Financial Crises, 15 NEXUS: CHAPMAN’S J. L. & 
POL’Y 15, 23 (2009) [hereinafter Morriss, Rules]. Proponents of this theory argue that generational 
wealth is not all bad: it enables families to create institutions that challenge state ideologies and over-
reaches through philanthropy and supporting reformist candidates for office; heavy redistribution may 
otherwise act as a tool of a seminally corrupt state to ensure its dominance over civil society. See 
HARRINGTON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 252. 
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Supporters of OFCs also point to their benefits for businesses. Because 
they are able to decrease costs by paying less taxes, firms with subsidiaries in 
offshore financial centers tend to have higher valuations than firms that only 
operate in onshore markets.52 In addition, setting up a subsidiary in an OFC for 
a new project—often called a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”)—allows other 
investors to join the new enterprise, thus spreading the risk.53 This is routine, 
for example, in the field of project finance.54 
B. Analytical Frameworks 
Although the debates over these policy rationales continue, the theoretical 
backgrounds from which each side operates are also important. This Section 
explores these analytical frameworks academics employ in their discussions of 
the benefits and consequences of OFCs.55 And interestingly, both sides of the 
debate seem to start at the same place: the global market for law.56 In the con-
text of an international system,57 businesses and individuals look for laws that 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Durnev et al., supra note 13, at 132–33, 151. But see ZUCMAN, supra note 12, at 56–57 (argu-
ing that states need revenue so that they can provide goods and services to their population—in partic-
ular, public goods such as roads, education, national defense, and public safety); SHAXSON supra note 
46, at 286 (arguing that taxation allows for property rights and even corporations to exist in the first 
place because the prerequisites to having a successful business or career often rest on the state’s abil-
ity to provide public goods). 
 53 PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 99; IMF BACKGROUND, supra note 13, at 4. But see Haberly 
& Wojcik, supra note 37, at 77 (describing the role of offshore vehicles in the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis). 
 54 PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 99. 
 55 See infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text. 
 56 One of the major originators of the idea of the law market was the economist Charles Tiebout 
in the late 1950s. See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956). In his influential paper, Tiebout argued that governments provide public goods and 
other services that their citizens demand and tax citizens correspondingly in order to supply these 
goods. Id. at 417. Citizen “consumer-voters,” however, will naturally understate their true preferences 
for public goods because they realize that an increase in goods supplied by the government leads to 
increased taxes; thus, Tiebout argued, the real test of which goods consumers want supplied is where 
they chose to live. Id. at 417–18. Moving to or from a location displays a citizen’s true desire for the 
relative levels of taxation and public goods supplied by that jurisdiction. Id. at 418, 420. Tiebout notes 
that his model rests on at least two major assumptions: first, that consumer-voters are easily able to 
move to where their preferences would lead them, and second, that the goods and services provided by 
one government do not have positive or negative effects on other jurisdictions. Id. at 419. Though 
these assumptions make some sense within a local or domestic context (as Tiebout envisioned them), 
they do not hold for the international law market created by tax havens. Permanently emigrating from 
one country to another is costly, time-consuming, and at times nearly irreversible; for the most part, it 
is only available to the wealthy and well-connected. Additionally, in contrast to Tiebout’s assumption 
in the consumer-voter analysis, tax haven legal regimes in fact impose external costs on onshore juris-
dictions, as well as other tax havens. See Boise, supra note 30, at 59–60. 
 57 See HARRINGTON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 134 (explaining that “[s]ince a fundamental 
principle of law holds that no sovereign state is obliged to enforce the laws or judgments of a foreign 
country, there is little the onshore state can do to enforce its claims”); PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 
18 (explaining that under the modern state system of “sovereign equality,” each state has the right to 
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are most favorable to them.58 At any point where they can take advantage of 
one system of laws as opposed to another, they will seek to maximize that ad-
vantage.59 OFCs happen to be the states that can provide the most favorable 
laws to a wide variety of consumers. 
Those who object to OFCs often object precisely because of this commer-
cialization of state sovereignty.60 Because making law is essential to being a 
state, critics argue that “selling law” to those who are willing to pay for it de-
grades what it means to be a state in the international system61 and perpetuates 
global income inequality62 and a regulatory “race to the bottom.”63 
                                                                                                                           
govern that which occurs within its borders; all states are equal in that no state has the right to govern 
what takes place within another state). Many tax havens have further enshrined these international 
principles of sovereignty in their domestic law through conflict of laws statutes. Rose-Marie Belle 
Antoine, The Legitimacy of the Offshore Financial Sector: A Legal Perspective, in REGULATORY 
COMPETITION, supra note 15, at 30, 45–46. 
 58 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22, at 4, 66 (2009); Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Com-
mercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 INT’L ORG. 151, 159 (2002) [hereinafter Palan, Sovereignty] 
(“On the contrary, Tiebout did not assume, as conventional theories of tax havens do, that corpora-
tions will necessarily migrate to the least regulated or least taxed realm.”). The businesses that create 
subsidiaries in tax havens tend to be large, international firms with high levels of intrafirm trade and 
research and development. Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., The Demand for Tax 
Haven Operations, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 513, 529, 530 (2006). 
 59 HARRINGTON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 235–36; O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22, at 67–
68; see Ronen Palan, Trying to Have Your Cake and Eating It: How and Why the State System Has 
Created Offshore, 42 INT’L STUD. Q. 625, 628, 630 (1998) [hereinafter Palan, Cake]. 
 60 Palan, Sovereignty, supra note 58, at 165 (describing sovereignty as the ability of the people 
within the territory to write the law); Palan, Cake, supra note 59, at 628, 630 (discussing “states’ will-
ingness to use their sovereign privileges to devise laws and regulations that are aimed at attracting 
business into ‘their’ territory”). 
 61 See HARRINGTON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 234 (explaining that those who use OFCs pros-
per from manipulating states’ sovereignty) Palan, Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 154, 159 (“The con-
sensus seems to be that tax havens are deliberate development policies that aim ‘to attract thereto 
international trade-oriented activities by minimization of taxes and the reduction or elimination of 
other restrictions on business operations.’” (citation omitted)). 
 62 Cf. G.K. CHESTERTON, THE MAN WHO WAS THURSDAY 189–90 (1908): 
So you talk about mobs and the working classes as if they were the question. You’ve 
got that eternal idiotic idea that if anarchy came it would come from the poor. Why 
should it? The poor have been rebels, but they have never been anarchists; they have 
more interest than any one [sic] else in there being some decent government. The poor 
man really has a stake in the country. The rich man hasn’t; he can go away to New 
Guinea in a yacht. The poor have sometimes objected to being governed badly; the rich 
have always objected to being governed at all. Aristocrats were always anarchists . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 Several arguments exist for opposing stark income inequality. First, as alluded to by Chesterton, 
there is no representation without taxation. Those who avoid taxes and can flee the county at a mo-
ment’s notice will not be patriotic citizens concerned with best interests of the country as a whole. 
Those who pay taxes have “skin in the game” in a county’s policies and outcomes; not paying taxes 
disincentivizes attending to civic duties like voting or using influence to shape the direction of one’s 
nation. HARRINGTON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 291–92. Second, the wealthy should be required to 
pay more in taxes because they have more to lose if public goods could not be provided and the state, 
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On the other side of the debate, some academics see this OFC-centered 
market for law as beneficial because it creates regulatory competition between 
states.64 As states compete to provide the best services to businesses and indi-
viduals at the lowest cost, they are forced to streamline regulations and legal 
regimes that hinder economic growth.65 Furthermore, this competition creates 
specialization and innovation, as states tailor their regulatory regimes to certain 
sectors or types of industries.66 
II. A THIRD APPROACH: EXAMINING OFCS THROUGH THE  
CONCEPT OF THE “RESOURCE CURSE” 
Although both of these analytical frameworks may be helpful in certain 
instances, a third perspective perhaps better describes the phenomenon of 
OFCs. This Part argues that the “resource curse” theory from academic litera-
                                                                                                                           
which should protect all citizens, disappeared. Boise, supra note 30, at 61. Third, redistribution is 
necessary to ensure the equality of opportunity because, if wealth is allowed to accumulate, it may 
lead to outsized political and legal influence. ZUCMAN, supra note 12, at 56–57; see, e.g., HARRING-
TON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 16 (describing how many recent presidential candidates, such as 
Presidents George W. Bush and Donald J. Trump and Governor Mitt Romney, had the means to run 
for political office largely because of their accumulated family wealth). 
 63 O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 22, at 33. But see Dionne & Macey, supra note 15, at 19 
(arguing that the “race to the bottom” theory is not completely true because a certain level of regula-
tion is necessary to maintain strong capital markets, which require several protections for market users 
and the earned confidence of investors); Morriss, Role of Offshore Financial Centers, supra note 32, 
at 112 (noting that businesses need a minimal level of the rule of law to function and that they take 
into account other factors besides the regulatory environment, including the educational level of a 
workforce and the a country’s preexisting infrastructure); Morriss, Rules, supra note 51, at 22 (“The 
differences between onshore and offshore regulators are thus not adequately described as two ends of 
a uni-dimensional spectrum. The regulatory competition is thus better described as a competition for 
the optimal level of regulation.”). 
 64 Assuming that, in general, businesses prefer lower levels of regulation—especially tax rates—
to higher levels, countries that slash their tax rates will often be able to make up the lost revenues from 
the increase in the number of businesses that chose to establish a presence there. Dhammika Dhar-
mapala & James R. Hines, Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1058, 1059 
(2009). This creates regulatory competition between countries to establish the most business-friendly 
jurisdictions. Morriss, Role of Offshore Financial Centers, supra note 32, at 103. Although this com-
petition can be mitigated by making agreements with other nations to keep regulation at a certain 
level, it is nearly impossible to have a treaty with every other nation on all of the possible issues the 
jurisdictions might compete. Id. 
 65 Dionne & Macey, supra note 15, at 12–13, 20–21; Morriss, Role of Offshore Financial Cen-
ters, supra note 32, at 108. But see PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 158 (claiming that there is no 
discernible impact on improved public services at lower costs due to regulatory competition). 
 66 Palan, Cake, supra note 59, at 640; see Dionne & Macey, supra note 15, at 16. A clear example 
of this is that offshore financial centers have concentrated on different sectors of the finance industry: 
Switzerland leads in banking, Bermuda in reinsurance, and the Caymans in hedge funds. ZUCMAN, 
supra note 12, at 26, 28; PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 38. See generally CHRISTOPHER M. BRUN-
ER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET-DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZ-
ING FINANCIAL WORLD (2016) (explaining the various specializations of “market-dominant small 
jurisdictions”). 
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ture on economic development may better account for offshore financial cen-
ters’ genesis and continued existence than other current paradigms. Further-
more, this alternative perspective may even articulate new directions for future 
prescriptive activity.67 
Although certainly not the only viewpoint,68 many scholars of economic 
development argue that a nation’s environment and natural resources (and 
stewardship of those resources) has a strong effect on a country’s economic 
success in the long run.69 In general, one might think that countries with more 
resources would be more successful, but for some countries a “paradox of 
plenty” occurs.70 Despite having plentiful natural resources, these countries lag 
behind other nations with fewer resources in terms of economic development; 
in addition, they often have higher rates of income inequality and corruption.71 
Often this incongruity takes place in countries with large amounts of a 
single resource. Because these countries are heavily dependent on world de-
mand for that commodity, boom and bust cycles prevent the sustained econom-
ic growth that is essential to long-term success. In addition, conflict often 
erupts over control of the resource because it is, more or less, the sole means of 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See infra notes 68–87 and accompanying text. 
 68 See, e.g., DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF 
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 40–44 (2012) (arguing that politics are the key determinant for 
what economic institutions a country has); William Easterly & Ross Levine, Tropics, Germs, and 
Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development, 50 J. MONETARY ECON. 3, 3, 35–36 
(2003) (exploring how geography, institutions, and policy affect a nation’s economic development); 
Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths 
of Growth Among New World Economies, in HOW LATIN AMERICA FELL BEHIND: ESSAYS ON THE 
ECONOMIC HISTORIES OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO, 1800–1914, at 260 (Stephen Haber ed., 1997) (ex-
plaining that American economic historians often claim that factor endowments account for a coun-
try’s history of economic development). 
 69 See generally AUTY, supra note 21 (supporting the importance of a country’s natural resources 
to economic development); JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUC-
CEED (2005) (advocating the importance of a country’s natural resources in its economic develop-
ment); ALAN H. GELB, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE? (1988) (supporting the importance of 
a country’s natural resources to economic development); Easterly & Levine, supra note 68, at 5 (ex-
plaining that Montesquieu and Machiavelli supported the view that a country’s economic develop-
ment is influenced by its natural resources); JEFFERY D. SACHS & ANDREW M. WARNER, NATURAL 
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, CTR. FOR INT’L DEV. & HARV. INST. FOR INT’L 
DEV., HARV. U. (Nov. 1997) (supporting the view that a country’s natural resources influence its 
economic development); Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, The Big Push, Natural Resource 
Booms and Growth, 59 J. DEV. ECON. 43 (1999) (same); Jeffery Sachs, Nature, Nurture, and Growth, 
THE ECONOMIST (June 12, 1997), https://www.economist.com/special/1997/06/12/nature-nurture-and-
growth [https://perma.cc/92JX-4T3J] (same). 
 70 Brooke Harrington, Why Tax Havens Are Political and Economic Disasters, THE ATLANTIC (July 
28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/tax-haven-curse/491411/ [https://
perma.cc/6SKD-H6NW] [hereinafter Harrington, Disasters]; see AUTY, supra note 21, at 1–2. 
 71 Harrington, Disasters, supra note 70. 
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fiscal and political power. The faction that controls the resource also controls 
the country in a phenomenon known in the literature as “state capture.”72 
Applying this concept to tax havens, a new perspective on OFCs depicts 
them as countries that are victims of the resource curse. Most OFCs are geo-
graphically small,73 remote74 islands with few natural resources.75 Lacking any 
true commodity to exchange in the global marketplace or the population size to 
have a robust domestic economy,76 OFCs have transformed their legal systems 
into a valuable resource for the global market to consume. They “sell” their 
favorable laws to businesses and individuals77 in exchange for corporate regis-
tration costs78 and money management fees79 as a means of gaining revenue 
for and improving the condition of the state80 and its inhabitants.81 States that 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Erika Weinthal & Pauline Jones Luong, Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative 
Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 35, 38 (2006); Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring 
Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract 261–62 (Initiative for Policy Dialogue 
Based at Columbia Univ., Working Paper Series Chapter 10, 2006), http://policydialogue.org/files/
publications/papers/Ch10.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JQW-7BXA]. 
 73 Surveying forty-one OFCs, Boise found that their combined landmass was less than that of 
New Zealand and their combined population was less than that of the state of Illinois. Boise, supra 
note 30, at 62. Furthermore, the average tax haven has a twenty-nine times smaller population than the 
average non-haven country. Dharmapala, supra note 37, at 663, 664. In addition, nearly 70% of tax 
haven countries are islands, whereas less than a third of all non-havens are islands. See id. at 664. 
 74 Boise, supra note 30, at 62. 
 75 Harrington, Disasters, supra note 70; see Dharmapala, supra note 37, at 663–64 (providing 
statistics that suggest that tax havens, on average, have twenty-seven times lower levels of subsoil 
assets per capita than non-haven countries). 
 76 See Naren Prasad, Escaping Regulation, Escaping Convention: Development Strategies in 
Small Economies, 5 WORLD ECON. 41, 41–42 (2004) (domestic marketplace in OFCs is too small). 
 77 For further proof that the financial mechanisms and legal entities that OFCs provide are prod-
ucts and—like any other consumer good—are subject to a “keeping up with the Joneses” mentality, 
see HARRINGTON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 146–47. One wealth management professional ex-
plained this OFC-related, consumer-like behavior in the following way: 
[C]lients just want the same asset structures as their friends have, regardless of whether 
their friends’ solution really fits for the client’s situation . . . . [T]hey’ll say, “I want a 
Cayman or a BVI company.” We explain why that’s not a good idea, and they often 
say, “I don’t care. I want one. My friends have them.” 
Id. 
 78 In the Cayman Islands, 14.5% of government revenues comes from international finance-
related fees; in the British Virgin Islands, the number is even higher, at 55%. Esther C. Suss, Oral H. 
Williams & Chandima Mendis, Caribbean Offshore Financial Centers: Past, Present, and Possibili-
ties for the Future 15 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/88, 2002). 
 79 See PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 31 (noting that some OFCs impose requirements on their 
clients to “maintain ‘dummy’ local directors” within the country). 
 80 OFCs may also “sell” their law through the following non-financial mechanisms and services: 
ship and aircraft registrations; trademark, patent and copyright registrations; economic citizenship 
programs (in which individuals pay fees to become a citizen of a given country); selling the fishing 
rights reserved to them under international law; leasing extensive parts of what little land they have 
for military bases (which are important due to the island’s strategic location); and, even being paid to 
hold refugees. Zoromé, supra note 13, at 7 n.9; Prasad, supra note 76, at 41 n.1, 54–55; NATIONAL 
PUBLIC RADIO, “The Middle of Nowhere,” This American Life, Episode 253 (Jack Hitt, contributing 
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might otherwise be among the poorest in the world have thus instead become 
among the wealthiest, all through the export of law.82 
Though some OFCs have been able to diversify to some extent into other 
sectors such as tourism,83 most economies remain reliant on exporting law. 
This causes many of the problems associated with the resource curse, includ-
ing massive downturns during global economic crises and state capture84 by 
                                                                                                                           
ed.) (Dec. 5, 2003) (transcripts available at https://www.thisamericanlife.org/253/transcript [https://
perma.cc/JZQ4-2AT3]). An additional mechanism that involves “selling law” is enacting legislation 
that provides for the release of very rare stamps, which an OFC can then sell to philatelists at high 
prices. Prasad, supra note 76, at 56. Some countries create “freeports”— plush warehouses with vaults 
for storing fine art, gold, and other valuables located at airports so that the goods are technically “in 
transit” and thus duty and tax free if bought, sold, or held in this location. ZUCMAN, supra note 12, at 
44–45; Freeports: Uber-warehouses for the Ultra-rich, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2013), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2013/11/23/uber-warehouses-for-the-ultra-rich [https://
perma.cc/648E-6734]. Other mechanisms include setting low fees for registering ships (which then fly 
the “flag of convenience” of the offshore jurisdiction) or selling country codes or domain names to 
corporations interested in these items as commodities. Prasad, supra note 76, at 55; see also ZUCMAN, 
supra note 12, at 57 (detailing how some countries have sold or licensed their international country 
code for phone sex chat lines, and how the small Pacific Island nation of Tuvalu has licensed its as-
signed country internet domain name (.tv) to websites that want to promote their connection to televi-
sion). 
 81 Revenues from company and trust registration fees have been used in some OFCs to improve a 
vast array of public services. See, e.g., Tony Freyer & Andrew P. Morriss, Creating Cayman as an 
Offshore Financial Center: Structure & Strategy Since 1960, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1297, 1320 (2013) 
(mosquito eradication); Prasad, supra note 76, at 57 (streetlights, paved roads, and electricity). Fur-
thermore, local residents can gain employment as the agents and administrators of the various legal 
entities. Morriss, Role of Offshore Financial Centers, supra note 32, at 107. But see HARRINGTON, 
CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 265 (describing how the best jobs in the industry are often still held by 
expatriates). 
 82 There is no better example of this than the Cayman Islands. Up until the mid-1900s, two major 
sources of income for the islands were turtle fishing and handicrafts; cattle wandered through the 
streets of the capital city, Georgetown, which had only one paved road and one bank. Marc Montgom-
ery, A Portrait of Success: The Rise of the Cayman Islands as an Offshore Financial Center, 12 RE-
VISTA MEXICANA DEL CARIBE 33, 47 (2001); Freyer, supra note 81, at 1304, 1326. Today, forty-three 
of the world’s top fifty banks have a branch on the islands. Suss et al., supra note 78, at 28–29. Ap-
proximately twice as many corporations are domiciled in the Caymans as people who live there, and 
79% of the population is employed in the service industry. PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 27–28; 
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Cayman Islands, in THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2013), https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cj.html [https://perma.cc/UE3X-MAQA] [here-
inafter CIA, Cayman Islands]. Overall, the Cayman Islands boasts a 4% unemployment rate and a per 
capita GDP higher than France, Japan, and the U.K., despite the fact that it must import 90% of its 
food and consumer goods. CIA, Cayman Islands, supra. 
 83 Suss et al., supra note 78, at 3 (tourism alone cannot sustain economic growth in most cases). 
 84 Because the domestic economies of offshore financial centers are highly reliant on fees paid by 
non-resident corporations and individuals, tax havens are particularly susceptible to shifts in foreign 
capital, which is highly mobile. PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 186; Suss et al., supra note 78, at 17. 
As an example of how easy it would be for financial services firms to move elsewhere, when Hurri-
cane Ivan struck the Cayman Islands in 2004, it destroyed ninety-five percent of structures on Grand 
Cayman (the largest island). Freyer, supra note 81, at 1387. By relocating staff and essential technol-
ogy prior to the storm, the Caymans were able to avoid negative effects on its major industries, and 
the number of company registrations actually increased during the month that storm hit. Id.at 1387–
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foreign85 investors. For example, in 2012, the Cayman Islands tried to enact a 
new payroll tax that would have targeted expatriates in the financial sector.86 
Foreign investors opposed this, so the government was forced to withdraw the 
planned tax so as not to put in jeopardy the sixty-five million dollars in fees 
collected annually from the offshore sector.87 
III. APPLICATION TO INVESTMENT LAW 
This new “resource curse” framework through which to view OFCs has 
potentially broad applications. As previously discussed,88 corporate and inter-
national tax law are almost certainly implicated when discussing tax havens. 
Yet the topic of international investment law is infrequently part of the conver-
sation. This Part argues that this alternative approach provides some new im-
plications for understanding international investment law, three of which are 
discussed below.89 The main goal of this discussion, however, is simply to of-
fer a possible application of the new analytical framework to an area of the law 
that is seldom associated with OFCs. 
                                                                                                                           
88. This “vulnerability to competition and dependence on the financial sector make their politicians’ 
and voters’ incentives differ from those of politicians and voters in onshore jurisdictions.” Morriss, 
Role of Offshore Financial Centers, supra note 32, at 134. Instead of focusing on the interests of the 
electorate, politicians in tax havens must cater to the demands of foreign investors, even though these 
businesses and individuals cannot vote for them. HARRINGTON, CAPITAL, supra note 15, at 248, 289; 
PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 158. The freedom that enables firms to choose in which jurisdictions 
to invest simultaneously decreases the freedom for voters in offshore financial centers to control their 
law and economic policies. SHAXSON, supra note 46, at 73. By raising government revenues through 
company registration fees and the like, offshore financial centers shift the majority of the tax burden 
off voters and onto non-residents. Morriss, Role of Offshore Financial Centers, supra note 32, at 107. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that these non-residents expect to have considerable sway over the 
government’s actions—they have been given a vote by paying into the system. See id. 
 85 It is also problematic that finance and investment flows are most strongly linked to nations that 
were OFC’s former colonial masters. Haberly & Wojcik, supra note 37, at 88. In some sense, the old 
system of slavery and plantations has been replaced by a new system in which foreign capital once 
again extracts a valuable resource—only now, this resource is the OFC’s favorable laws rather than 
tangible products like minerals or crops. Nevertheless, the actors and their relative positions of domi-
nance are the same as in the former era. See id. at 79, 93 (calling tax haven links between the U.K. and 
its former colonies a second British empire). 
 86 Freyer, supra note 81, at 1390. 
 87 Id. at 1386. This example shows a serious effect of state capture: the “unbundling” of state 
sovereignty. Sovereignty usually consists of the power to both decide the subject matter of the law as 
well as compel those within the sovereign’s jurisdiction to follow it. Bracking, supra note 2, at 618. 
Although tax havens still have the capacity to pass and enforce law, they can no longer dictate its 
content. Id. This loss of control over law’s content is equivalent to a partial destruction of state sover-
eignty and—for countries with representative governments—the loss of popular sovereignty. Gregory, 
supra note 2, at 893; Palan, Cake, supra note 59, at 630. “Although they claim their sovereign rights, 
these states have an independence that is more apparent than real, for their developmental and social 
goals are subject to the whim of foreign capital.” PALAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 187. 
 88 See Part I, supra notes 27–66 and accompanying text. 
 89 See infra notes 92–105 and accompanying text. 
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First, BITs with Investor State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) mechanisms 
are part of the total package of law that OFCs use as a resource to attract com-
panies, along with their low tax rates, secrecy, and easy-to-form legal entities. 
For example, Mauritius is an island nation off the coast of Africa with favora-
ble tax rates.90 It is also highly ranked in the World Bank’s annual “ease of do-
ing business” survey, which measures how conducive a jurisdiction is to start-
ing and operating a business.91 These two factors alone would no doubt attract 
foreign capital. But in addition to all of this, Mauritius also has forty-seven 
BITs either signed or in force, many of which are with African countries.92 Be-
cause Mauritian entities will have increased protections compared to those 
formed in other countries without BITs in place, Mauritius’s numerous BITs 
makes it an even more attractive location for multi-national corporations to 
form subsidiaries and SPVs in when they invest in Africa. 
To further elaborate on the Mauritian example, Mauritius has a BIT in 
place with Tanzania93 that provides for compensation of losses due to conflict94 
and state expropriation,95 as well as ISDS.96 This ensures that multi-national 
                                                                                                                           
 90 It is, by many accounts, a tax haven. See, e.g., Will Fitzgibbon, Rise of Tax Haven Mauritius 
Comes at the Expense of Rest of Africa, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.irishtimes.com/
business/rise-of-tax-haven-mauritius-comes-at-the-expense-of-rest-of-africa-1.3282982 [https://
perma.cc/75UJ-DWKZ]. 
 91 See Rankings & Distance to Frontier, WORLD BANK (2017), http://www.doingbusiness.org/
en/rankings [https://perma.cc/KC9M-P44B] (ranked twenty-fifth, above countries like Spain and Ja-
pan). 
 92 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Investment 
Agreements Navigator: Mauritius, INV. POL’Y HUB (2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
IIA/CountryBits/134#iiaInnerMenu [https://perma.cc/7LD3-BSSE]. 
 93 The Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (United Republic of Tanzania) Regula-
tions 2009, Mauritius-Tanzania, Oct. 15, 2009, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/
TreatyFile/1996 [https://perma.cc/RSK3-X6T3]. 
 94 See id. Art. 5, Compensation for Losses: 
Investors of either Contracting Party whose investments in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party suffer losses owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state 
of national emergency, revolt, insurrection or riot in the territory of the latter Contract-
ing Party shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party treatment as regards restitu-
tion, indemnification, compensation or other settlement, not less favourable than that 
which the latter Contracting Party accords to its own investors or to investors of any 
third State. 
Id. 
 95 See id. Art. 6, Expropriation: 
Investments of investors of either Contracting Party in the territory of the other Con-
tracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to measures having 
effects equivalent to nationalization or expropriation except for public purposes, under 
due process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and ef-
fective compensation. 
Id. 
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corporations looking to invest in Tanzania, but wanting lower tax rates, will 
regard Mauritius as a perfect conduit because their investments through a Mau-
ritian entity will likely remain well-protected. 
The BIT package is thus only a part of the inducement for foreign inves-
tors to create Mauritian entities. It would seem that Mauritius would not be 
terribly concerned with ensuring that its interests are protected because most of 
the investment into Mauritius does not stay there; instead, it goes into other 
countries. As such, Mauritius—as well as other OFCs with BITs—likely will 
not fight to rectify imbalances in agreements that favor investors. This incon-
sistency has implications for reforming international investment law, which is 
already seen as favoring investors97 over states in many cases.98 
Second, BITs play a signaling role for OFCs to inform investors of their 
level of sophistication and differentiate them from other players in the market. 
There is a fair bit in the OFC literature about so called “tiers” of OFCs.99 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See id. Art. 8, Settlement of Disputes Between an Investor and a Contracting Party (“If the 
dispute cannot be settled through negotiations within six months, either party to the dispute shall be 
entitled to . . . initiate arbitration proceedings either to [ICSID or based on UNCITRAL rules] . . . .” ). 
 97 See, e.g., Philip De Man & Jan Wouters, Improving the Framework of Negotiations on Interna-
tional Investment Agreements, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 233, 238 (Oliver De Schutter, 
Johan Swinnen, & Jan Wouters eds., 2013) (“[T]he one-sidedness of most BITs currently in force 
shows that the potential for a balanced outcome of investment negotiations is rather limited . . . .”); 
ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 85, 93 (2012) 
(arguing that investors can trump a state’s exercise of public authority through IIAs and that tribunals 
thus usurp the power of nations’ constitutions and highest courts); Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton 
Sanchez Badin, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law from the Global South: An Introduc-
tion, in RECONCEPTUALIZING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1, 3 
(Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin eds., 2018) (“[T]here is a growing demand for a 
more balanced approach between investors and states, imposing more obligations on the former.”). 
But see DAVID COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 322–24 (2017) 
(disagreeing with such criticisms because BITs were not meant to an provide equal distribution of 
rights and because there are fewer responsibilities held by investors than critics claim). Collins notes 
that although international investment agreements (“IIAs”) place many obligations on host states, such 
as “non-discrimination, FET, FPS, and guarantees against expropriation without compensation,” there 
are “remarkably few” features that assign responsibilities to investors. Id. Because Collins sees IIAs as 
“voluntary commitments” that were “never meant to apportion rights and obligations evenly,” howev-
er, he disputes these criticisms of imbalance. Id. 
 98 This one-sidedness of many investment treaties has been further exacerbated by third-party 
financing of investor claims against states. See FRANK J. GARCIA, HYUN JU CHO, TARA SANTOSUOS-
SO, RANDALL SCARLETT & RACHEL DENAE THRASHER, THE CASE AGAINST THIRD-PARTY FUNDING 
IN ISDS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, B.C. L. SCH.-PUC UNIV. OF CHILE, WORKING GRP. ON TRADE & 
INV. L. REFORM, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING TASK FORCE (2018), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2130&context=lsfp (describing various issues, including lack of appellate 
review and rule of law issues). For examples of firms involved in third-party arbitration finance, see 
the following webpages: Buford Capital, http://www.burfordcapital.com/; Fullbrook Management, 
https://fulbrookmanagement.com/; and Calunius, http://www.calunius.com/. 
 99 See, e.g., Javier Garcia-Bernardo et al., Uncovering Offshore Financial Centers: Conduits and 
Sinks in the Global Corporate Ownership Network, 7 SCI. REP. 1 (2017) (describing tiers of OFCs 
based on the industries and regions they serve and whether they are “sinks” where capital stays or 
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Though all OFCs—rightfully or wrongfully—have developed the reputation as 
“tax havens” or locations for “dirty money,” some OFCs are seen as more le-
gitimate than others in the eyes of the international business community and 
thus can attract more capital and investment.100 BITs tell investors that a par-
ticular OFC is of a higher tier than others and help the OFC to better sell its tax 
and corporate legal regimes and their corresponding benefits. Top-tier OFCs 
like Mauritius and Singapore101 have many BITs, whereas bottom-tier OFCs, 
                                                                                                                           
“conduits,” where capital flows to another jurisdiction from). Providing another example of the im-
portance of reputation, in 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) put together a list of Non-
Cooperative Countries or Territories (“NCCTs”) and condemned them for their excessive secrecy, 
legal provisions, minimal mechanisms to report suspicious transactions, loopholes in regulation, and 
lack of administrative and judicial oversight of the finance industry. Gordon, supra note 33, at 91; 
Suss et al., supra note 78, at 19. Thirty-five jurisdictions were listed in the report, with fifteen being 
labeled non-compliant. Boise, supra note 30, at 66; Suss et al., supra note 78, at 8. By creating this 
“blacklist,” FATF had essentially labeled all businesses with financial entities in these countries as 
potentially engaged in criminal activity, but going further than this, FATF recommended that other 
countries take countermeasures against the fifteen NCCTs, which could include “conditioning, re-
stricting, targeting, or even prohibiting transactions with uncooperative jurisdictions.” Gordon, supra 
note 33, at 92; see William Vlcek, Competitive or Coercive? The Experience of Caribbean Offshore 
Financial Centres with Global Governance, 97 THE ROUND TABLE 439, 443 (2008), https://doi.
org/10.1080/00358530802057418. Not wanting to be known as a haven for “dirty money,” which 
would discourage legitimate business, countries did whatever they needed to get themselves removed 
from the blacklist, and within six years, the blacklist had shrunk from fifteen nations to zero. Mont-
gomery, supra note 82, at 62; Sharman, supra note 46, at 501; Dionne & Macey, supra note 15, at 14. 
The changes that tax havens put in place to get themselves removed from FATF’s disapproval, how-
ever, were mostly cosmetic and did not substantially change the existing legal regimes. YOUNG, supra 
note 33, at 163; see Antoine, supra note 57, at 32 (the Bahamas abolishing bearer shares); James L. 
Butkiewicz & Leo-Rey C. Gordon, The Economic Growth Effect of Offshore Banking in Host Territo-
ries: Evidence from the Caribbean, 44 WORLD DEV. 165, 168 (2013) (the Cayman islands requiring 
banks to open and staff offices); Suss et al., supra note 78, at 11 (providing examples of the various 
cosmetic changes that OFCs made to their processes to ensure their removal from the blacklist). At 
least part of the reason more changes were not made was due to the high costs of implementing a 
comprehensive reform of the financial sector. Vlcek, supra, at 443 (noting that actualizing and main-
taining all of the requirements to be in compliance with FATF recommendations would have cost the 
Bahamas up to $45 million a year, according to some estimates). 
 100 Suss et al., supra note 78, at 18. In fact, there is some evidence that the act of moving off 
FATF’s blacklist actually benefited several countries, leading to improved credit ratings, positive 
press, and even better reputations than before. KLAUS-WALTER RIECHEL, FINANCIAL SECTOR REGU-
LATION AND SUPERVISION: THE CASE OF SMALL PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES, INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, ASIA & PACIFIC DEP’T, POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER 4 (2001). This seems to make sense on an 
intuitive level. Before the blacklist, there was no external body measuring standards; companies and 
individuals seeking to consume tax haven law had few ways to judge which offshore financial centers 
were better than others. The blacklist acted as a stamp of approval for those countries that were not on 
it, and by removing itself from the list, a jurisdiction could show that a reputable third party had in 
effect certified its legitimacy. See id. 
 101 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator: Singapore, INV. POL’Y HUB 
(2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/190#iiaInnerMenu [https://perma.cc/
4NQW-MM5X] (showing that Singapore has entered into 44 BITs). Some top-tier OFCs, however, do 
not have BITs. See, e.g., UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator: Cayman Is-
lands, INV. POL’Y HUB (2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/37#iiaInner
Menu [https://perma.cc/Z3LP-P83K] (no BITs); UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements 
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like Nauru, lack these investment agreements.102 To draw a domestic parallel, 
BITs signal to multi-national companies that they should view an OFC like 
American companies view the state of Delaware: a jurisdiction with a sophisti-
cated legal regime and preferential tax treatment that offers a robust setting in 
which to form companies and invest from. 
Finally, on a different note, a recurring question in international invest-
ment law is how to curb the negative environmental and social effects of in-
vestment.103 Often, this question is framed in terms of a particular project or 
issue,104 like how a given factory might affect endangered species living near-
by or cause disruption in a local community. This example of OFCs highlights 
how investment in the aggregate might impact an entire country. The resource 
curse analytical framework demonstrates how relying solely on foreign in-
vestment might spur far-reaching outcomes across social and political institu-
tions, especially through the dangerous consequences of state capture by indus-
tries that are largely foreign-controlled and subject to severe market fluctua-
tions.105 
                                                                                                                           
Navigator: Bermuda, INV. POL’Y HUB (2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/Country
Bits/22#iiaInnerMenu [https://perma.cc/8NZJ-EMT5] (no BITs). This may be because these OFCs 
have found other ways to signal their status or perhaps because they were so well-regarded before 
BITs became widespread they did not need to enter into BITs to boost their reputation. 
 102 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator: Nauru, INV. POL’Y HUB (2013), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/146#iiaInnerMenu [https://perma.cc/8DWM-
3W5V] (no BITs); see also UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator: Cook Islands, 
INV. POL’Y HUB (2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/48#iiaInnerMenu 
[https://perma.cc/3GUX-EMSR] (no BITs). 
 103 See Olivier De Schutter, The Host State: Improving the Monitoring of International Agree-
ments at the National Level, in FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 157, 177 (Oliver De Schutter, 
Johan Swinnen, & Jan Wouters eds, 2013) (“[A]rbitral tribunals[’] . . . general attitude has been to 
dismiss arguments based on human rights as irrelevant to investment disputes.”). See generally Col-
lins, supra note 97, at 250–83 (discussing public interest issues affected by international investment 
agreements, including the environment, human rights, and culture). 
 104 See, e.g., Morosini & Badin, supra note 97, at 10–11 (arguing that “[e]nforcement of these 
treaties in several jurisdictions negatively impacted some host countries’ ability to regulate in the 
public interest” in areas such as the “right to water, right to health, the protection of cultural sites, the 
protection of the rights of indigenous people” and other similar issues and collecting cases from 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL and ICSID tribunals involving Argentina, Tanzania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Cana-
da, Australia, and Uruguay, among others, illustrating these specific disputes). 
 105 A powerful example of state capture comes from Antigua, where R. Allen Stanford, an Amer-
ican businessman, relocated his enterprises in return for enormous tax breaks and legal concessions by 
the government. Harrington, Disasters, supra note 70. Stanford was able to ensure these breaks con-
tinued by giving money for hospitals and various other seemingly philanthropic works, many of which 
ultimately benefitted him. Id. His business and philanthropies eventually grew to the second largest 
employer on the island, but when it was discovered that he was actually running a Ponzi scheme and 
jailed, Antigua suffered a massive setback—GDP dropped by 10%, and even tourism revenues de-
clined because of the bad publicity. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Essay chronicled the two major viewpoints on tax havens and pro-
vided a third analytical framework—which draws on economic development 
research—to describe offshore financial centers as sellers of law in a global 
marketplace in which they have little else to offer. This new perspective pro-
vides an alternative vantage point from which others can pursue further stud-
ies, in addition to the suggestions offered here for how the framework might be 
applicable to international investment law. By looking at offshore finance 
through the lens of academic literature on the resource curse, it may be possi-
ble to better understand this global phenomenon and suggest avenues for 
meaningful reform or remediation.106 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Seeing offshore financial centers as countries struggling with the resource curse could mean 
that solutions that were successful for other resource-cursed countries could similarly work for off-
shore financial centers. One such promising solution is channeling profits from the dominant resource 
into a sovereign wealth fund. Sovereign wealth funds are government-administered pools of financial 
assets used to achieve macroeconomic objectives, often savings or fiscal stabilization. Udaibir S. Das, 
Yinqiu Lu, Christian Mulder & Amadou Sy, Setting Up a Sovereign Wealth Fund: Some Policy and 
Operational Considerations 4–5, 12 n.18 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/179, 2009). 
They are usually put in place after commodity booms in countries where a single commodity domi-
nates. Id. at 10. For example, Norway set up its sovereign wealth fund in 1990 after riding the ups and 
downs of the prices of oil, one of the major commodities that it produced; the proceeds from good 
years were placed in the fund, which could then create a return and help reduce the short fallings dur-
ing bad years. Mehmet Caner & Thomas Grennes, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Norwegian Experi-
ence, 33 WORLD ECON. 597, 599, 602 (2010); see also DAVID KINLEY, NECESSARY EVIL: HOW TO 
FIX FINANCE BY SAVING HUMAN RIGHTS 145–46 (2018) (discussing the fund’s refusal to invest in 
companies with poor environmental or social records). 
 These funds are a way to defy the resource curse through diversification. Especially if the fund is 
externally managed, it would seem that sovereign wealth funds could also improve governance and 
perhaps prevent state capture. For countries experiencing the resource curse, whoever controls the 
major resource controls the state because the major resource is the primary locus of the state’s reve-
nue. If the state has revenue from a sovereign wealth fund that is externally managed, the state has 
other means to provide for itself and therefore cannot be corrupted by those who control the resource. 
If tax havens were to set up sovereign wealth funds and channel some of the proceeds from the sale of 
their laws into those funds, they could create alternative sources of revenue, minimizing the need to 
structure their legal system favorably for outsiders. In fact, at least one offshore financial center has 
taken a step in this direction: the tiny Pacific island nation of Tuvalu created the Tuvalu Trust Fund, 
managed with help from Australia and New Zealand, which provides over twenty-one percent of rev-
enue for public expenditures. See Prasad, supra note 76, at 56; TUVALU TRUST FUND, http://tuvalutrust
fund.tv/ [https://perma.cc/JAJ3-L7KG]. 
